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Abstract
In this study, we predict a pattern of o¤shoring and reshoring over the course of
economic development. We achieve this, by extending Grossman and Rossi-Hansbergs
(2008) model of o¤shoring in a simple way by assuming that o¤shoring requires both
workers and capital in the o¤shored country. As a consequence, the accumulation of
capital in the o¤shored country has two opposing e¤ects on o¤shoring. On the one
hand, it increases the wage rate of workers rendering o¤shoring less attractive. On the
other hand, it decreases the rental price of capital rendering o¤shoring more attractive.
Putting these two e¤ects together, we analytically generate the inverted-U pattern of
o¤shoring recently observed in China.
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"A growing number of American companies are moving their manufacturing back to the
United States." The Economist (2013)
1 Introduction
Since the mid 1990s, the amount of o¤shoring from developed countries to China has been
steadily increasing; for example, Xing (2012) nds that the volume of processing trade in
China increased from about US$10 billion in 1994 to US$300 billion in 2008. However, this
increasing trend of o¤shoring in China has recently been reversed; for example, according
to The Boston Consulting Group (2011), "[t]ransportation goods such as vehicles and auto
parts, electrical equipment including household appliances, and furniture are among seven
sectors that could create 2 to 3 million jobs as a result of manufacturing returning to the
U.S. - an emerging trend that is expected to accelerate starting in the next ve years".
In a subsequent survey, The Boston Consulting Group (2012a) nds that "[m]ore than a
third of U.S.-based manufacturing executives at companies with sales greater than $1 billion
are planning to bring back production to the United States from China or are considering
it". Porter and Rivkin (2012) also nd that the rapidly rising wages abroad represent
an important trend that is beginning to make US rms favor locating their production
domestically.
In this study, we show how a simple model of o¤shoring can explain this pattern of
o¤shoring and reshoring. As a result of economic development, physical capital in China has
been accumulating at a rapid rate; for example, according to Bai et al. (2006), gross xed
capital formation as a share of gross domestic product in China increased from 30% in 1978 to
42% in 2005. Furthermore, the wage rate of workers has also been rising rapidly; for example,
The Boston Consulting Group (2012b) nds that the "15 to 20 percent annual increases in
Chinese wages [...] were rapidly eroding Chinas manufacturing cost advantage over the
U.S.". At the rst glance, these two stylized facts seem to suggest that capital accumulation
in China should lead to a gradual reduction in o¤shoring because of its positive e¤ect on
wages, which renders o¤shoring less attractive. However, if one considers an often neglected
fact that o¤shoring also requires the use of domestic capital in the o¤shored country (i.e.,
o¤shored production requires both workers and equipment in the o¤shored country), then
capital accumulation in China would also have a positive e¤ect on o¤shoring.
To generate the abovementioned e¤ects, it su¢ ces to consider the seminal model of o¤-
shoring in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008).1 We extend the Grossman-Rossi-Hansberg
model by allowing for the possibility that o¤shoring of labor-intensive tasks requires the use
of both workers and capital (e.g., plants, equipment, information and telecommunication
structures2) in the o¤shored country. In this case, an increase in the capital stock in China
has two opposing e¤ects on the incentives of o¤shoring. On the one hand, it increases the
wage rate of workers rendering o¤shoring less attractive. On the other hand, it decreases the
1In the literature on o¤shoring, there is an important alternative strand of studies that focus on the choice
of organizational form by rms; see the seminal studies by McLaren (2000), Grossman and Helpman (2002,
2004, 2005), Antras (2003), Antras and Helpman (2004) and Antras et al. (2006).
2Communication between the o¤shored country and the o¤shoring country is essential for the o¤shoring
activity, which requires telephones, faxes, and computers, etc.
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rental price of capital rendering o¤shoring more attractive; for example, according to Bai
et al. (2006), the rate of return to non-mining capital in China decreases from 30% in the
mid 1980s to less than 20% in the early 2000s. Putting these two e¤ects together generates
an inverted-U e¤ect of capital accumulation on the equilibrium level of o¤shoring, which is
consistent with the recently observed inverted-U pattern of o¤shoring in China. However,
our prediction does not apply only to the albeit very important Chinese case, but also to
the generality of other o¤shored countries.
2 A simple model of o¤shoring and reshoring
We consider the Grossman-Rossi-Hansberg model of o¤shoring. The model consists of two
goods j 2 fx; yg, which are produced using labor and capital in the form of two varieties
of tasks: L-tasks and K-tasks. The measure of each variety of tasks is normalized to one.
Firms in the developed country produce both goods. In addition to employing local workers,
they can also o¤shore some of the L-tasks to workers in the developing country. Here we
di¤er from Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) by assuming that this o¤shoring process
also requires the use of capital in the developing country in order to capture a simple fact
that workers in China require local equipment to complete the o¤shored tasks. Therefore,
both capital and labor in the developing country can either be used for domestic production
or for o¤shoring production. We will refer to the developing country (for example, China)
as the home country, which is assumed to be a small open economy for simplicity. In order
for the e¤ects of factor supplies to work explicitly, as is well known in international trade
theory, we need more factors than produced goods; therefore, we assume that the home
country produces only one good, say good y. In this industry, a rm needs afy units of
domestic factor f 2 fL;Kg to perform a typical f -task. Due to substitutability between
L-tasks and K-tasks, rms choose aLy and aKy to minimize their cost. Following Grossman
and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), we assume that there is no substitution within the f -tasks, so
that each task must be performed once to produce a unit of good y.
If a foreign rm in industry j performs L-task i using local workers, it requires aLj
units of local labor. If the foreign rm performs L-task i through o¤shoring, it requires
lj(i) = a

Ljt(i) units of labor and kj(i) = lj(i) units of capital in the o¤shored country. Here
 > 0 is a shift parameter that inversely captures technological improvement in o¤shoring
and   0 measures the extent to which each o¤shoring worker requires local capital (e.g.,
the equipment that each worker needs to perform the tasks). For convenience, we order the
tasks by increasing di¢ culty of o¤shoring (i.e., t0(i) > 0 for i 2 [0; 1]). Due to the assumption
of the home country being a small open economy, all foreign variables denoted by superscript
 are given exogenously.
Naturally, we focus on the equilibrium in which o¤shoring exists by assuming that
aLjw
 > aLjt(0)(w + r) and a

Ljw
 < aLjt(1)(w + r). Therefore, there must exist a
threshold value of i, denoted as I, such that
w = t(I)(w + r). (1)
The left-hand side of (1) is the wage cost for rms in the foreign country whereas the
right-hand side is the o¤shoring costs of task I. In both industries j 2 fx; yg, for i  I,
3
foreign L-tasks are o¤shored to the home country. For i > I; foreign L-tasks are performed
domestically in the foreign country.
In the home country, the unit cost for domestic rms in industry y is waLy+raKy. Perfect
competition implies
waLy + raKy = py = 1, (2)
where we normalize the world price of good y to py = 1. The factor-market condition for
labor in the home country is given by
aLyy + Z

Z I
0
t(i)di = L, (3a)
where Z  aLxx + aLyy captures the production scale in the foreign economy. In other
words, labor in the home country is either used for domestic production aLyy or o¤shoring
production Z
R I
0
t(i)di for foreign rms. Similarly, the factor-market condition for capital
in the home country is given by
aKyy + Z

Z I
0
t(i)di = K. (3b)
In other words, capital in the home country is either used for domestic production aKyy or
o¤shoring production Z
R I
0
t(i)di for foreign rms.3
From cost minimization, we can derive afy(w=r) as a function of w=r, where w is the
wage rate of workers and r is the rental price of capital. Taking afy(w=r) into account,
the equilibrium conditions (1), (2) and (3) determine fw; r; y; Ig. Using (3), we can express
capital intensity in the home country as
aKy
aLy
=
K   Z R I
0
t(i)di
L  Z R I
0
t(i)di
. (4)
Given that aKy=aLy is naturally an increasing function of w=r,4 the ratiow=r can be expressed
using (4) as
w
r
 !(I;K). (5)
By (4), we may note two properties of the function !: (a) ! is increasing (decreasing) in I if
K > (<) L; and (b) ! is increasing in K. We now solve (2) and (5) for r and w to obtain
the expressions of w (!(I;K))5 and r(!(I;K))6, where w0() > 0 and r0() < 0.7
We substitute w (!(I;K)) and r(!(I;K)) into (1) to obtain
w = t(I)[w (!(I;K)) + r (!(I;K))], (6)
3To ensure a positive output of y, we assume L > Z
R I
0
t(i)di and K > Z
R I
0
t(i)di.
4We will consider an explicit production function below.
5Specically, w (!(I;K)) = !(I;K)=[!(I;K)aLy(!(I;K)) + aKy(!(I;K))].
6Specically, r(!(I;K)) = 1=[!(I;K)aLy(!(I;K)) + aKy(!(I;K))].
7In the appendix, we derive these comparative statics.
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which determines the equilibrium level of o¤shoring I for a given K. The o¤shoring costs
in the right-hand side of (6) may increase or decrease with !(I;K), and the following chart
summarizes the intuition.
K " ) !(I;K) " ) r # ) o¤shoring cost #
w " ) o¤shoring cost " ) I "# .
As K increases, the capital cost r decreases but the wage cost w increases. To understand
how these e¤ects a¤ect o¤shoring, we consider a CES technology with the following unit
production function
h
 (aKy)
" 1
" + (1  ) (aLy)
" 1
"
i "
" 1
= 1, where " > 0 is the elasticity of
substitution between capital and labor. Cost minimization implies that the factor price ratio
in (5) becomes
!(I;K) =
1  


aKy
aLy
 1
"
=
1  

 
K    Z R I
0
t(i)di
L  Z R I
0
t(i)di
! 1
"
. (7)
Finally, using (7) and the unit production function, we can express (6) as8
w = t(I)
8>><>>:

"! (I;K)" 1 + (1  )" 1" 1| {z }
w(!(I;K))
+ 
h
" + (1  )"! (I;K) (" 1)
i 1
" 1| {z }
r(!(I;K))
9>>=>>; . (8)
We rst consider the special case of  = 0 as in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008).
In this case, a larger stock of capital increases the wage rate of workers rendering o¤shoring
less attractive; in other words, capital has a monotonically negative e¤ect on o¤shoring I,
which is inconsistent with empirical observation. When  > 0, the negative e¤ect of capital
on the rental price r generates an additional positive e¤ect on o¤shoring. Putting these
two e¤ects together generates an inverted-U relationship between o¤shoring and capital,
which is consistent with the recently observed inverted-U pattern of o¤shoring in China. We
summarize all these e¤ects in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 As capital K increases in the o¤shored country, the wage rate w increases
and the rental price r of capital decreases. As for the equilibrium level of o¤shoring I, it
rst increases and then decreases after K exceeds L. In other words, there is an inverted-U
relationship between o¤shoring I and the capital stock K in the o¤shored country.
Proof. Di¤erentiating the right-hand side of (8) with respect to I, we can show that it is
monotonically increasing in I, noting (7).9 Given that the left-hand side of (8) is constant,
there uniquely exists an equilibrium level of I that is determined by the intersect of both
sides. Di¤erentiating the right-hand side of (8) with respect to K, we can show that it is
decreasing (increasing) in K when K < (>)L, noting (7).10 Then, simple graphical analysis
would su¢ ce to complete the proof.
8In the appendix, we provide the derivations.
9In the appendix, we provide the derivations.
10In the appendix, we provide the derivations.
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3 Conclusion
In this study, we rst documented a pattern of o¤shoring and reshoring in China. Then,
we developed a simple framework to explain this stylized fact. In summary, we nd that
economic development in o¤shored countries initially causes an increase in o¤shoring activ-
ities but eventually leads to a return of o¤shoring tasks to developed countries. Intuitively,
capital accumulation as a result of economic development in o¤shored countries raises the
wage rate of workers and reduces the rental price of capital giving rise to a U-shaped pat-
tern in the cost of o¤shoring over the course of economic development, and these theoretical
implications are consistent with the empirical trends in China.
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Appendix
Comparative statics of r() and w():
Assume that the unit production function F (aKy; aLy) satises the standard neoclassical
properties: for each i = K; L; @F (aKy; aLy) =@aiy = Fi (aKy; aLy) > 0; @2F (aKy; aLy) =@ (aiy)
2 =
Fii (aKy; aLy) < 0; F (aKy; aLy) = F (aKy; aLy) for any  > 0: First, given the homogene-
ity of degree 1 in function F (aKy; aLy), we can have
r = F1 (aKy; aLy) and w = F2 (aKy; aLy) , (A1)
noting py = 1: We can easily verify from Eulers homogeneous function theorem that
Fi (aKy; aLy) is homogeneous of degree 0 for each i; implying F1 (aKy; aLy) = F1 (aKy=aLy; 1)
and F2 (aKy; aLy) = F2 (aKy=aLy; 1) : Given these two expressions, with Fii (aKy; aLy) < 0;
F1 (aKy; aLy) is a decreasing function in aKy=aLy: Since @2F (aKy; aLy) = (@ (aKy) @ (aLy)) =
F21 (aKy; aLy) > 0 holds due to the neoclassical properties, F2 (aKy; aLy) = F2 (aKy=aLy; 1) is
an increasing function in aKy=aLy: By the cost minimizing condition F2 (aKy; aLy) =F1 (aKy; aLy) =
w=r; we then verify a positive relationship between aKy=aLy andw=r:As a result, F1 (aKy; aLy)
(F2 (aKy; aLy)) is a decreasing (increasing) function in w=r. Equation (A1) ensures that r
(w) increases (decreases) with w=r:
Derivations of equation (8):
The cost minimization condition gives rise to
aKy
aLy
=


1  
w
r
"
. (A2)
By (A1) and (A2),
r =

" + (1  )"
w
r
 (" 1) 1" 1
and w =

"
w
r
" 1
+ (1  )"
 1
" 1
are calculated from the CES production function. Together with (6), these expressions would
prove (8).
Comparative statics of equation (8):
w = t(I)
0BB@ "! (I;K)" 1 + (1  )" 1" 1 +  " + (1  )"! (I;K) (" 1) 1" 1| {z }

(I;K)
1CCA .
First, with (7), di¤erentiating 
(I;K) with respect to I yields
@
(I;K)
@I
= "

" + (1  )"! (I;K) (" 1)
 2 "
" 1
	(I;K)
d!(I;K)
dI
;
where
	(I;K)  1  
 
L  Z R I
0
t(i)di
K   Z R I
0
t(i)di
!
8
and
d!(I;K)
dI
= (!(I;K))1 "

1  

"
Zt(I)
"
K   L
L  Z R I
0
t(i)di
2 :
Note that both 	(I;K) and d!(I;K)=dI are strictly positive if and only if K > L. Thus,
@
(I;K)=@I > 0 always holds. Given t0(I) > 0, the right-hand side of (8) increases with I:
Next, di¤erentiating 
 with respect to K yields
@
 (I;K)
@K
= "
 
"! (I;K)" 1 + (1  )" 2 "" 1 ! (I;K)" 2 	(I;K) d!(I;K)
dK
;
where, in the same way as above, 	(I;K) > 0 if and only ifK > L:Given that d!(I;K)=dK >
0 always holds, we have shown that the right-hand side of (8) increases with K if K > L
and decreases with K if K < L.
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